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THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT:
WHAT WENT WRONG; CAN WE FIX IT?
JULIUS GETMAN*
Abstract: When the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") was enacted,
both labor and management believed that it would pave the way for
unionization and the spread of collective bargaining. The key provisions
that led to such great hopes by unions and their supporters remain in
force, but after many years of working with the NLRA, optimism has given
way to cynicism and despair about the law's ability to protect workers and
enhance collective bargaining. This Essay provides tentative suggestions
for structuring a legislative agenda that would make basic labor law more
even handed and protective of basic worker rights. Recognizing that basic
labor law is currently not a friend to unions, the Essay concludes that
even though efforts to improve it are likely to meet with significant
resistance, they are, nevertheless, worth the effort.
When the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 1 was enacted,
both labor and management believed that it would pave the way for
unionization and the spread of collective bargaining. 2 Unlike the Na-
tional Recovery Administration, which preceded it, the Wagner Act
was carefully structured to be effective. 3 Many aspects of the new law
were innovative, its provisions were powerful, and its scheme for en-
forcement was carefully chosen. It contained a sweeping enunciation
of employee rights, provisions for determining whether employees
wished to be represented by a union, and a requirement that the em-
* © 2003 Julius Getman, Earl E. Sheffield Regents Chair in Law, University of Texas at
Austin School of Law. This Essay is based on a talk the author gave at The Future of Organ-
ized Labor, an interdisciplinary conference held in Washington, D.C. April 22-23, 2003.
The Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources hosted the conference. Por-
tions of this Essay appear in JULIUS G. GETMAN, BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, & DAVID L.
GREGORY, LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1999).
I Hereinafter also referred to as the "Act."
I See generally IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING Pot.tcv
(1950); JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A
STUDY IN ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW (1974),
2 The current NLRA, codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000), is a combi-
nation of the major provisions of the Wagner Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(designated the National Labor Relations Act); the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments, Pub.
L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136 (designated the Labor Management Relations Act); and the 1959
Landrum-Griffin Amendments, Pub, L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (designated the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959).
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ployer bargain with a union selected by its employees. Perhaps most
encouraging to union supporters, the NLRA was to be developed and
applied by an expert agency rather than the courts—labor's historic
enemy. The key provisions that led to such great hopes by unions and
their supporters remain in force, but after many years of working with
the NLRA, optimism has given way to cynicism and despair about the
law's ability to protect workers and enhance collective bargaining.
How has this come about and what, if anything, should and can be
done to make the law fairer and more effective?
I. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN LIMITING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LAW
A. The Continuing Role of the Judiciary
The scheme of the NLRA envisioned no role for the courts with
respect to the representation election process, and a limited task of
enforcing National Labor Relations Board (the "NLRB" or 'Board")
orders with respect to unfair labor practices. But the courts are noto-
riously difficult to replace or control. The notion that courts would
simultaneously defer and enforce was unrealistic. So long as the
courts had the power to refuse enforcement, it was inevitable that
they would use this power to require the Board to interpret the NLRA
in accordance with their views of desirable policy. In addition, three
factors combined to make them particularly feisty in dealing with
Board decisions.
First, the reasons advanced for deferral to the Board—its exper-
tise and neutrality—were quickly perceived to be fictional. As it be-
came obvious that the Board was performing the function of an adju-
dicatory body—applying or interpreting general language, developing
doctrine, and finding facts—and that its policies changed with its po-
litical makeup, the reasons to defer seemed less compelling.
Second, because of its concentration on the NLRA, the Board was
not in the position to undertake the important task of harmonizing
NLRA policy with the policy behind other statutes and laws. This be-
came increasingly important as other labor-related statutes and policies
were developed. The courts have primary responsibility for harmoniz-
ing the NLRA with the policy favoring arbitration and with the antidis-
crimination, antitrust, and bankruptcy laws, and developing the law
dealing with the relationship between the employee and the union, an
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area not dealt with by the NLRA. The labor injunction was reinstated by
the Taft-Hartley Amendments. 4 Because the board lacked injunctive
power, this approach increased the role of courts, which then had the
primary responsibility for determining the legality of strikes.
Third, the NLRA is a mix of inconsistent policies set forth in
broad general language. - The statutes that combined to form the
NLRA have competing visions of the appropriate role of government,
the importance of the strike, and the legitimacy of the labor injunc-
don. Both thë Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin amendments reflect
in their provisions uneasy compromises between fiercely contending
political forces. The result is a hodgepodge of confusion. 5
B. The Continuing Influence of Common-Law Concepts
Under the common law, employers by virtue of their ownership
were entitled not only to set wages and working conditions unilater-
ally, but to fire employees for any reason, blacklist union supporters,
and refuse to deal with a union despite the manifest desire of its em-
ployees. The NLRA was intended to replace judicial commitment to
property rights and instead put the force of law behind the rights of
employees to unionize, strike, and bargain collectively. But the com-
mon law, like judicial discretion, dies hard. Thus, in 1938, only a few
years after the NLRA's passage, and in the face of the ringing en-
4 29	 § 160(j) (2000).
6 Section 7 of the NLRA, its original language largely intact, announces a broad right
to engage in ... concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection." Id. § 157. Section 13, another of the NLRA's original provisions,
specifies that "[n]othing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided ... shall be
construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
strike." Id. § 163.
This language is in sharp contrast with the language of § 8(b) (4), which makes it an
unfair labor practice:
to engage in, or to induce ... any individual ... to engage in, a strike or a re-
fusal ... where in either case an object thereof is ... forcing or requiring any
person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in
the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer.
Id. § 158(b) (4). The literal provisions of this language are violated in almost every strike in
which the strikers seek to prevent pickups or deliveries. The NLRA thus contains language
recognizing the common goals of organized labor and language that, if read literally,
would outlaw almost all strikes and most inducements to strike. Similar tension exists be-
tween the policy favoring free collective bargaining developed by the Wagner and Taft-
Hartley Acts and § 8(e), which prohibits agreements by which unions seek to enlist the
support of an employer in favor of their organizing efforts elsewhere. Sec id. § 158(e). The
NLRA's inconsistencies invite judicial reconciliation.
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dorsement of the right to strike in § 7 and § 13, the United States Su-
preme Court announced in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. that
an employer had not lost the right to protect and continue his busi-
ness by supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he is not bound to
discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the election of
the latter to resume their employment, in order to create places for
them."6
 This decision, which was of enormous consequence because
of its impact on the strike weapon, also helped to set a pattern of in-
terpreting the NLRA to 'interfere as little as possible with traditional
property rights.
The Supreme Court has. similarly elevated traditional property
rights over the rights of unions in a series of cases dealing with access
to employees.? It has in these cases essentially rejected the position
that the law should balance the advantages of property in representa-
tion campaigns by making sure that employees get a chance to learn
about the merits of unionization. Employers may assemble employees
and make the case against unions. During the campaign that precedes
a representation election, employers regularly avail themselves of this
right and seek to convince employees of the harm that might come
from unionization and the likely futility of collective bargaining. In its
decisions in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., NLRB v. United Steelworkers,
and Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, the Court effectively rejected the idea that
the Board could balance the employees' rights under § 7 of the NLRA
against employer property rights. 8
 The union is not entitled to re-
spond to the employer's captive audience speech; and its organizers,
without regard to interest balancing, may be kept from the employer's
premises.
Similarly, the courts of appeals have given greater weight to an
employer's right to discharge an unsatisfactory employee than to the
NLRA's prohibition on discriminatory discharge. In cases where a le-
gitimate reason could be found for discharging a union supporter,
courts of appeals have regularly defied the Supreme Court's instruc-
tion that they defer to the Board's findings of improper employer mo-
a 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
7 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN L. REV,
305, 311-25 (1994) (discussing Supreme Court decisions regarding union actions and
employer property rights).
a See Lechmere, 502 U.S. 527, 538, 539 (1992); United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 363
(1958); Babcock, 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
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tivation.9 Courts have refused to hold that employers who close down
parts of their enterprise in response to unionization have done so to
discourage union activity, and they have refused to order employers
who discriminatorily close down all or part of their business to restore
shut down functions." And the Supreme Court has permitted em-
ployers to respond to unionism by going out of business.
In addition, underlying property rights give the employer the
final say with regard to the future of workers unlawfully discharged
during an organizing campaign and ordered reinstated. The Board
does not monitor its decision to determine whether reinstated em-
ployees in fact return and remain. Studies suggest that most do not—
that they are ultimately forced out by continued harassment.n Thus,
union activity is regularly costly for those who engage in it. The Court
has also rejected the idea that the Board may seek to deter unlawful
employer conduct by punishing wrongdoers."
II. THE EQUIVOCAL PERFORMANCE OF THE NLRB
Through most of its history, the Board has been politically moti-
vated and legalistically oriented. Its opinions have been far more of-
ten based on conjecture and surmise than on understanding of the
realities of labor management relations.
There are a variety of reasons why the Board so little resembles
the vision of its earliest advocates. One is the political nature of the
appointments process, which• sometimes has' been used to reward la-
bor for its support and sometimes has been used as a way of punishing
labor for opposing the President's policies. The judicial nature of the
task has mandated the appointment of lawyers, which historically has
meant politicians with little or no labor-relations background, former
Board employees, or those with only partisan experience. The vague,
contradictory, and complex language of the statute has permitted the
Board to express its policy decisions through a myriad of technical
9 See, e.g., Mueller Brass Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 815, 817, 821 (5th Cir. 1977); NLRB v.
Lassing, 284 F.2d 781, 783 (6th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F.2d 324,
328-29 (6th Cir. 1955).
" See Coronet Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 158 F.3d 782, 795 (4th Cir. 1998); Local 57, lnt'l
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 299-300 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
11 ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 256-57 (13th ed. 2001).
12 See Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938), See gmeral 1 y J, Pope,
Post-New Deal Economic Due Process and the Decline of the American Labor Movement
(Oct 15, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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doctrines and subdoctrines that have increased the complexity of the
law, even as they have limited and reduced the rights of workers.
All of this might be less significant if the personnel and procedures
of the Board were such as to permit it to develop true institutional ex-
pertise so that it could ultimately draw upon its own experience and
whatever is known about labor relations by scholars and experienced
people in the field. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The way the
Board is constructed, those whci are responsible for announcing its
policies and applying its decisions have very little to do with those who
have field experience, who interview employees, or who hear the cases.
Those who investigate in an unfair labor practice proceeding are part
of the regional office staff that is responsible to the General Counsel,
not to the Board. Cases are not tried by the Board members, but by
administrative law judges. For reasons of administrative neutrality, the
Board members have little contact with the regional offices or the ad-
ministrative law judges. Although it has been administering the NLRA
for over sixty years, the Board has never engaged in an effort to deter-
mine empirically the impact of the law on employer or union conduct:
As it has acknowledged "in evaluating the interference resulting from
specific conduct, the Board does not attempt to assess its actual effect
on employees, but rather concerns itself with whether it is reasonable
to conclude that the conduct tended to prevent the free formation and
expression of the employees' choice."Is Thus, the elaborate structure of
Board rules is not grounded in any respect on factual data. It largely
rests, rather, on guesses or assumptions. There is nothing in the collec-
tive activities or experiences of the Board that ensures the accuracy of
the assumptions upon which these rules are based.
Less understandable than its own failure to investigate reality is
how little effort the Board makes to incorporate into its decisional
process what has been learned by research into labor management
relations. To read through a volume of Board opinions is to be struck
by the perfunctory nature of its opinions and the lack of sophisticated
analysis when the Board does undertake to analyze a labor law issue.
Its effort is almost always confined to elaborating its own doctrine and
treating as established reality its previous assumptions.
The Board has had to apply its myriad of doctrines and subdoc-
trines to the complex facts of labor management relations. The result
would be confusion and uncertainty, even if there were significant
continuity on the Board. Given the political nature of the Board and
13 See 33 NLRB ANN. REP. 60 (1969).
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its tendency to change complexion with the political environment,
however, the problem becomes magnified many times. New Boards
are always in a position to distinguish away most of the precedent that
is inconsistent with their political values, and to refuse to accept much
of the rest. The matter is further complicated by the fact that the
Board often attempts to adjust its doctrine or to articulate it in such a
way as to avoid judicial rejection. This has meant a significant differ-
ence between doctrines as announced and as applied.
For those reasons, the Board has supplied neither expertise, nor
clear doctrine, nor consistency.
A. The Impact of Other Laws and Other Decision.makers
1. The Reemergence of State Law
It was recognized from the early days of the NLRA that state tort
law was a major potential threat to strikes and a lesser but nonetheless
significant threat to organizing drives. Much that happens during
strikes can be construed as tortious by an unfriendly state court,
Picket lines, meant to prevent scabs from working, coexist uneasily
with the tort of interference with business relationships. Angry shouts
and insults typically hurled by pickets at those crossing the line are
intended to inflict emotional harm. Raised fists, threats, pushing and
shoving, and pounding on cars can all be characterized as assaults. In
a major strike, the potential liability of unions for tortious conduct
may be great.
In the early days of the NLRA, when the right to strike was
treated with greater solicitude by the courts than it is now, two doc-
trines were developed to protect union activity from the reach of state
law. Major protection came from the broad doctrine of preemption
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1959 holding in San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon that if union activity was even argua-
bly protected or prohibited by the NLRA, then state jurisdiction was
displaced. 14 The second important doctrinal protection came from
robust enforcement of § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which pro-
vides that unions and their leaders are not to be held liable "except
upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of
. . . or of ratification of such acts."15
14 See 359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959).
/5 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 6, 47 Stat. 71 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 106 (2000)).
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Both of these protections have been significantly reduced. The
sweeping rules of preemption set forth in Garmon were undercut first,
in 1966, in Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, in
which the Court held that libel and defamation claims againrst a union
during an organizing drive could be dealt with under state law, 16
Then, in 1977, Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, Local 25 expanded the Linn holding by permitting a suit
against the union for intentionally inflicting emotional harm. 17 Al-
though in both defamation and emotional harm cases federal guide-
lines require the state court to find that the action in question is not
protected under the federal statute, the limitation is not a serious
one. Almost by definition any action which constitutes a tort under
state law is likely to be held unprotected by the Board. In addition,
efforts to protect unions and union leaders from vicarious liability
have been substantially undercut by a series of cases broadly applying
the concepts of authorization and ratification. As Ray Marshall and I
have written, with regard to instances of violence directed against
strike breakers, "[r] ecent cases suggest movement towards a standard
in which union leaders will be held liable unless they take what the
court or jurors consider to be reasonable steps to prevent violence.'"
Thus any serious strike these days will carry with it the threat not
only of injunctions and Board unfair labor practice findings but also
of liability under state law.
2. Arbitration
The Supreme Court's decisions adding the force of law to the
arbitration process had originally been thought of as a victory for or-
ganized labor. After all, it was the Steelworkers that brought the cases
to the Court that constituted the first "trilogy" and was the victorious
party in them. 19
 The new policy supporting arbitration has, however,
through a series of remarkable Board decisions, become a basis for
routinely ignoring statutory rights.
18 See Linn, 383 U.S. 53, 55 (1966).
17 See Fanner, 430 U.S. 290, 302-03 (1977).
la Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, The Continuing Assault on the Right to Strike, 79
TE.x. L. REV. 703, 725 (2001).
111
 These cases dealt with the enforcement of the promise to arbitrate and of the arbi-
trator's decision. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
599 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
585 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 569 (1960).
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The framers of the NLRA recognized the possibility of overlap-
ping jurisdiction between the Board and arbitrators, and specifically
declared that the Board's power to remedy unfair labor practices
"shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention
that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or other-
wise."2° Nevertheless, the Board, in its famous 1971 Collyer Insulated
Wire decision, announced a policy of refusing to process charges
where the underlying issue could be arbitrated. 21 .The Collyer decision,
which at first applied only where the employers' breach of contract
was alleged to violate § 8(a) (5), was soon extended to cases in which it
was claimed that the employers punished employees for engaging in
protected union activity. For a variety of reasons this decision was a
serious blow. to employees and unions and at odds with the basic poli-
cies of the NLRA. As the Supreme Court later itself pointed out, arbi-
tration is typically not a good process for dealing with difficult issues
of fact, and arbitrators are unlikely to be expert in NLRA law nor do
they have the support system that the Board does for fact finding or
following precedent. 22 In addition, forcing unions to arbitrate means
forcing them to spend money from their treasury. By contrast, the
Board was established to make the enforcement of statutory labor
rights a public expense. The sweep of this policy is very broad because
almost any employer violation of the Act during the term of an
agreement is likely to be subject to arbitration under the terms of the
agreement.
The Board's pre-hearing deferral policy has been exacerbated by
its post-hearing policy of refusing any but the most limited review of
arbitral opinions. In Olin Corp. the Board announced in 1984 that if
the issues were "factually parallel" and if the arbitrator was "presented
generally with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice"
it would accept the arbitrator's award unless it was "not susceptible to
an interpretation consistent with the Act."23
The combination of the Collyer and Olin doctrines constitutes a
general refusal by the Board to enforce statutory rights during the term
of an agreement..It has ceded this role to decisionmakers who are not
20 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).
11 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 841-42 (1971). See genemllyJulius G. Getman, Labor Arbitmtion and
"Diipute'Reitiliiition; 88 YALi L..1: . 916 (1979); Cornelius J. Peck, A Pmposal to End NLRB Defer-
ral to the Arbitration Pmcess, 60 WASH, L. Ray, 355, 359 (1985).
22 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56-58 (1974) (discussing reasons
arbitration is inappropriate for resolving issues regarding rights arising under Tide VII).
22 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 576, 577 (1984).
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expert in interpreting the law and a process that is not devised for deal-
ing with difficult statutory issues. Thus, when it comes to protecting § 7
job rights, the Board is ineffectual prior to unionization and largely in-
different thereafter.
B. The Declining Role of Collective Bargaining
One of the least predictable aspects of the law's development has
been the retreat from collective bargaining. The NLRA originally
seemed to envision collective bargaining as the end product of ma-
ture labOr relations, the process by which employee participation and
industrial peace could be achieved, management rights protected,
and rival claims articulated and resolved. Collective bargaining, where
given a chance, has generally been successful in achieving these im-
portant goals. Where it has not been defeated by union failure or
management intransigence, it has helped employees to achieve
greater power, wealth, and dignity. The widespread use of seniority as
a result of collective bargaining, and the almost automatic limitation
on the employer's right to discharge, established the principle that
employees, through their work, develop a legally enforceable claim to
their jobs, and that most management decisions affecting significant
employee interests must be based on legitimate, objective standards.
Through bargained-for pensions and supplemental benefits, employ-
ees under collective bargaining are provided protection for their old
age and a cushion against unemployment. It is noteworthy that, in all
these areas, the benefits achieved through collective bargaining have
been gradually made available to employees more generally.
Collective bargaining has given American unions a visible,
significant presence on the shop floor, and it has brought many of
them great resources, political power, and economic leverage. For
many employers this system, although limiting control and possibly
raising labor costs, has provided stability. It has reduced quit rates,
encouraged the development of reasonable rules uniformly applied,
helped to create a sense of common enterprise, and thereby often
promoted productivity and efficiency. Through collective bargaining,
labor and management have developed a private system of dispute
resolution culminating in arbitration, the success of which has been
widely acknowledged. This has given impetus to private and public
efforts to develop similar systems in various areas of society. Despite
this record of achievement, the judicial attitude towards collective
bargaining has increasingly become one of suspicion, hostility, and
indifference. By narrowly defining "wages," "hours," and "conditions
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of employment," the courts have significantly increased the ability of
employers to take action unilaterally. They have also held that em-
ployers are not required to bargain about decisions that are deemed
to lie at the "core of entrepreneurial control," but only about the im-
pact and effects of those core entrepreneurial decisions. 24
The reason for the courts' retreat from collective bargaining is
difficult to identify, but it seems to rest on a shift in contemporary judi-
cial thinking about economic issues. The NLRA, when originally
passed, had a Keynesian justification. Collective bargaining, it was be-
lieved, would increase the wealth of employees, thereby stimulating the
economy and reducing the likelihood of depression and recession. To-
day, courts are more likely to see collective bargaining as an interfer-
ence with the benevolent working of the market, and, thus, inconsistent
with economic efficiency most likely to be achieved by unencumbered
management decision making. This change in theory is well illustrated
by the Supreme Court's 1981 decision in First National Maintenance
Coil). v. NLRB removing the issue of plant closings from the bargaining
table, and by subsequent decisions removing other areas involving capi-
tal investment from the bargaining requirement. 25
C. The Continued Weakening of the Right to Strike
Since the NLRA's passage, the legal protection of the strike
weapon has been significantly reduced. At the moment, the right to
strike is so constrained by legal and practical barriers that strikes are
rarely used and even more rarely used effectively. Strikers and unions
employing the strike face panoply of official sanctions that, taken to-
gether, make the right to strike a costly and risky endeavor. In addition
to their legal right to hire permanent replacements, employers can of-
ten bring lawsuits against unions that, one way or another, run afoul of
the many legal proscriptions on the strike. The range of penalties that
might be imposed on strikers and unions by employers, courts, and
government has been broad, and the penalties imposed often costly.
Major strikes have been responded to by martial law, criminal indict-
ments, fines, and military action. Strikes and picketing have been en-
joined. Strikers have been fired, and unions have been fined and held
liable for damages. Union leaders have been arrested, jailed, and con-
24 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., con-
curring); see First Nat'l Maint, Corp, v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676-80 (1981).
25 See 452 U.S. at 686. See generally Julius G. Getman, The Courts and Collective Bargaining,
59 CH I.-KENT L. REV. 969 (1983) (discussing First National).
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victed of crimes for encouraging violence, - sometimes with very little
evidence of personal misconduct. The combination of RICO 3 28 a newly
expanded view of the Hobbs Act, 27
 and a greater willingness to find that
union officials encouraged or participated in violence, all combine to
increase the vulnerability of unions and union leaders to criminal and
civil penalties for acts of strike misconduct. 28
Without an effective right to strike, collective bargaining be-
comes ineffectual, and the desire of employees to join unions is inevi-
tably reduced.
D. Inhibiting Flexibility
The hallmark of the new union tactics described by other schol-
ars is flexibility and innovation. Flexibility involves dealing with em-
ployers in nontraditional ways and utilizing union strength to achieve
recognition without waiting for Board certification and electoral pro-
cess. It also means a new focus on economic pressure and less concen-
tration on the traditional picket line. This new approach differs
sharply from the traditional Board-oriented approaches to organizing
and collective bargaining where representation campaigns and elec-
tions followed a customary path in which the behavior on both sides
was predictable and the result was either formal certification or the
union's disappearance from the workplace.
How much flexibility does the law permit in terms of union tac-
tics and employer response or initiatives? In terms of protecting em-
ployees who use innovative tactics, the courts have traditionally read
§ 7 and the right to engage in concerted action very narrowly, creat-
ing limitations not suggested by either the language or underlying
policies of the NLRA. With respect to bargaining, the law is also likely
to be hostile to innovative processes. We know that the concept of ex-
clusivity together with § 8(a) (2) forbids an employer from bargaining
with a minority union on behalf of a unit in which the union does not
represent a majority. In other respects, questions abound. Does a un-
ion that seeks minority representation violate the NLRA? Is its activity
protected? May a union seek to bargain for its members alone? At
least two major legal scholars, Clyde Summers and Charles Morris,
" Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000)).
27 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1960.
28 See generally Getman & Marshall, supra note 18.
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believe that minority unions may bargain for their own members. 29
According to Professor Summers:
Although there is no duty on the employer to bargain with a
minority union, if a minority union is able to obtain a con-
tract, a "members only" contract is legal and enforceable in
the absence of a majority union. In that case, a minority un-
ion is legally protected in engaging in concerted activity such
as striking and picketing to pressure an employer to sign
such a contract."
Despite the support of such distinguished scholars, this position is, in
my view, wrong.
My basic reasons for disagreeing are first, that any agreement
which applies to union members only would violate § 8(a) (3)." This
proposition was established in 1952 when the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the SeCond Circuit held in NLRB v. Gaynor News Co. that granting
benefits to union members that were denied to nonunion members
violated § 8(a) (3) because it was "inherently conducive to increased
union membership?" The Supreme Court affirmed in 1954, stating,
Tin holding that a natural consequence of discrimination, based
solely on union membership or lack thereof, is discouragement or
encouragement of membership in such union, the court merely rec-
ognized a fact of common experience?" Second, any agreement that
either overtly or tacitly applies more generally to the work force vio-
lates the concept of exclusivity and therefore violates § 8(a) (2)."
If minority bargaining is unlawful, we must still determine what
constitutes bargaining and what conduct short of bargaining an em-
ployer and a minority union may engage in. New forms of bargaining
" Sec Charles J. Morris, A Blueprint for Reform of the National Labor Relations Act, 8 Auras IN.
U. AM. U. 517, 553-55 (1994); Clyde W. Summers, Exclusive Representation: A Comparative
Inquiry into a "Unique" American Principle, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & PoCvi. 47, 57 (1998).
" Summers, supra note 29, at 57.
31 "Thus both the Board and the courts automatically find a violation when an em-
ployer treats union members differently from non-union members." Julius G. Getman,
Section 8 (a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. Cm. L. REV.
735, 736 n.6 (1965).
" 197 F.2c1 719, 722, 755 (2c1 Cir. 1952), affil sub nom. Radio Officers' Union of the
Commercial Tel. Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
53 Radio Officers' Union, 347 U.S. at 46.
See Intl Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 739 (1961) (hold-
ing that granting a minority union the right to bargain for the entire unit violated
§ 8(a) (2) without regard to employer motivation). "There could be no clearer abridgment
of § 7 of the Act.* Id, at 737.
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supported by new tactics also raise questions about the reach of § 7 and
what George Schatzki refers to as the "misnomer" of protected activ-
ity.33
 Can employers fire employees who use either traditional or unor-
thodox forms of pressure on behalf of bargaining demands by minority
unions or groups of employees? Unfortunately, this is yet another area
in which the labor movement cannot safely look to the NLRA or the
courts for help. As already noted, the broad language of § 7 has been
narrowed by the courts to the point that unorthodox pressure tactics
are usually held unprotected and even strikes seeking unorthodox .
goals are rarely protected.36
 Thus, under the law, traditional organizing
and strike tactics are perilous, and innovations even more risky.
Although it is impossible to trace the impact of any specific as-
pect of labor law, the overall anti-union trend of the law must cer-
tainly have some role in the overall difficulty unions face in organiz-
ing and in striking. As Professor James Pope has commented in an
article dealing with many of these same cases: "Naken together they
may account for a substantial proportion of the decline in the Ameri-
can labor movement."37
III. SUGGESTIONS
How should labor and its allies go about the complex task of
seeking change in the basic labor law to make it more even handed
and more protective of basic worker rights? In the current political
climate, labor is so busy protecting its remaining rights that significant
reform is difficult to pursue actively. But what if the political climate
changed so that labor's friends are in the majority? How should la-
bor's agenda for legal reform be shaped? It is a pleasant problem to
contemplate, and I offer some tentative suggestions as to how a legis-
lative agenda should be framed. Three emphasizing principles should
guide the decision making.
Particular over General: As already argued, the general language of
the NLRA has permitted the Board and the courts to insert their own
often anti-union, property-right-friendly views into the law. The more
general the language of change, the more likely that pro-union poli-
cies may be subverted. The most successful pro-labor legislation was
36 See generally George Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misno-
iner—"Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 -11x. L. REV. 378, 378 (1969).
36 See generally id.
37 Pope, supra note 12.
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Norris-LaGuardia, a carefully constructed statute that dealt with a
specific problem."
A Negative over a Positive It is easier to bring about the desired
change by eliminating limits on union activity than it is by increasing
regulation of employer response and judicial action.
Collective Bargaining over Organizing It is apparent that collective
bargaining and organizing are complementary. They fuel each other's
success, and each one's gain leads to success in the other. But which
should be the first priority fot legal change?
I believe that legislation strengthening collective bargaining is
easier to achieve, and that once achieved, it is most likely to be effec-
tive and to spur union organizing. My experience in talking to hun-
dreds of workers in organizing situations persuades me that they fre-
quently end up rejecting a union because they become convinced that
bargaining will be futile and dangerous."
If unions are to choose specific targets, what should they be?
A. Overturn. the Mackay Doctrine
In my view, the most needed and most useful change would be
overturning the Mackay doctrine.4° The Mackay doctrine not only
weakens the strike weapon, which is crucial to effective collective bar-
gaining, but also is a destroyer of lives and communities.'" It also pro-
vides employers with a powerful argument against unionization. In
almost every NLRB representation campaign, employers have made a
variant of the following argument:
If you vote for the union, I will bargain but I will bargain hard; and
under the law I am not required to accept any proposals that I think
would be harmful to the enterprise. The only way the union can by
38 Norris-Laguardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-
115 (2000)).
" The Workplace Fairness Act, the Labor Reform Act of 1977, and the Dunlop Com-
mission report all contain recommendations that, if enacted, would make the law more
protective of workers' rights and the interests of labor unions. See H.R. 5, 102d Cong.
(1991); H.R. 8410, 95th Cong. (1977); COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP
COMMISSION]. It is difficult to imagine, however, their wholesale adoption any time in the
immediate future. Even if the law was amended, it is difficult to imagine a successful strat-
egy for restraining the anti-union biases of the courts and conservative Board.
4o
	 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tele. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) (recognizing an
employer's right to hire permanent replacements for striking employees).
41 See generally JuLaus CETMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14 (1998) (recounting a sev-
enteen-month strike and how it permanently changed participants' lives).
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to get me to change my mind is by pulling you out on strike. If that
happens, I have the right to permanently replace anyone who strikes.
That means when you are ready to come back you will no longer
have a job.
The availability of such tactics might explain why the Getman-Goldberg
study found the perception of threats by employees was not
significantly different in hard-fought legal campaigns than in hard-
fought illegal campaigns. 42
Repeal of the Mackay doctrine poses no great technical or draft-
ing problems. It is an issue on which public support can be achieved,
and one that has the capacity to invigorate rank and file activism.
B. Eliminate § 8(b) (4) of the NLRA
Another high-priority goal should be the repeal of § 8(b) (4),
which would mean the legalization of union boycotts and expansion
of the concept of mutual aid. 45 Section 8(b) (4) places massive and
unique limitations upon the ability of unions to use economic pres-
sure to support each other's strikes. No one doubts that its repeal
would be a great victory for unions and that legislative achievement of
this goal has been long sought and almost impossible to achieve.
The practical elimination of § 8(b) (4) may, however, be achiev-
able through the courts, although it would require rethinking the re-
lationship between labor law and the First Amendment. For a long
time union lawyers have been engaged in a frustrating effort to limit
the content of employer speech in representation elections to prevent
the use of threats and promises. The effort has been largely fruitless
and is likely to remain so. No matter where the line between threats
and prediction is drawn, an expression of carefully crafted employer
propaganda will be able to convey the dangers of unionism and the
promise of benefits essentially as effectively as prohibited speech. And
even if employer speech is found to be illegal, the remedies are likely
to be worthless."
Even in the context of representative elections, speech regulation
hurts unions more than employers. Setting aside an employer victory
is almost always meaningless, because the employer will remain in
42 SeejULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATIVE ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY
118 (1976).
is See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4).
B Even in those very, very rare cases in which the Board orders and the courts accept,
the chances for crafting a bargaining relationship are remote.
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control of wages and working conditions. But setting aside a union
victory based on appeals to face promises, or threats, or racial attacks,
reverses the express will of the employees.
More significantly, restrictions on employer speech invite recip-
rocal regulation of union speech. Reciprocity underlies the courts'
willingness to uphold restrictions on union picketing in situations
where picketing would otherwise be constitutionally protected. Under
any analysis consistent with First Amendment holdings in other areas,
the provisions of § 8(b) (4) and § 8(b) (7) should both be held uncon-
stitutional. But the U.S. Supreme Court continues to apply them and
to assume their validity.
The most vivid illustration of the Court's singling labor out as an
area of limited First Amendment applicability is contained in its 1982
opinion in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 45 In that case, the Court
held that secondary picketing by the NAACP, that would have been
illegal secondary activity if undertaken by a labor union, was constitu-
tionally protected.46 The Court in Claiborne attempted to distinguish
labor picketing and speech from NAACP picketing and speech on two
grounds: first, that boycott activities by unions are economic rather
than political; and second, that labor speech is part of a special system
of balanced congressional regulation. The Court stated:
This Court has recognized the strong governmental interest
in certain forms of economic regulation, even though such
regulation may have an incidental effect on rights of speech
and association.... Secondary boycotts and picketing by la-
bor unions may be prohibited, as part of "Congress' striking
of the delicate balance between union freedom of expres-
sion and the ability of neutral employers, employees, and
consumers to remain free from coerced participation in in-
dustrial strife."47
The rationale is so weak and inconsistent with general First
Amendment jurisprudence that perhaps the Court can be persuaded
45 See 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
45 Id. at 912-13. For this conclusion the Court relied on its opinion in Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the case that first held labor picketing to be constitutionally pro-
tected. See Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 909, 911-12. The Thornhill case has since been distinguished
to the point of irrelevance in the labor context, The Court's reviving of it might be a signal
that the Court is willing to rethink the issue of labor picketing and the First Amendment.
47 Claiborne, 958 U.S. at 912 (citations omitted) (quoting NLRB v. Retail. Store Employ-
ees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part)).
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to re-examine its previous perfunctory analysis of labor picketing.
Such reconsiderations may in fact be underway. In 1988, in Edward
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades
Council, the Court abandoned the conclusion that labor union ap-
peals to customers are necessarily a form of commercial speech." It
concluded instead that union handbills that "pressed the benefits of
unionism to the community and the dangers of inadequate wages to
the economy and the standard of living of the populace," were a form
of constitutionally protected political speech.49
 What remains then of
the Claiborne defense of gt'eater regulation of union speech is the ar-
gument that the NLRA is an area of balanced speech regulation. The
delicate balance described by the Court is the balance between union
free-speech rights and the rights "of neutral employers, employees,
and consumers to remain free from coerced participation in indus-
trial strife."50
 This balancing approach is inconsistent with all other
First Amendment analyses of boycotts which hold boycotts legal and
do not attempt to balance speech rights against the claims of neutral
employers or customers. In other boycott situations it is assumed that
free speech trumps the interests of neutral employers and customers.
Thus, it appears that the delicate balance the Court finds in labor
law is actually the balance of restrictions on both employers and un-
ions. This balance needs to be reconsidered. Unions can facilitate the
process of reconsideration in several ways. First, the labor movement
can choose appropriate cases in which to raise First Amendment
picketing claims—cases in which picketing is peaceful with no intima-
don of physical intimidation and in which the picket signs cast labor's
claim in broad societal terms. Second, unions should indicate a gen-
eral willingness, as part of the effort to restore First Amendment
rights in labor, to permit any employer speech that does not contain
an explicit threat. The risk is small and the potential gain great.
The effort to expand labor's right to picket and make common
cause with each other should be a part of the new, and in my view,
promising effort to make the public understand that labor rights are a
critical part of human rights. The picket line is one place where work-
ers get to state their case and inform other workers of their grievances.
It provides a small counterweight to the distorted view of labor regu-
larly portrayed in the media. To eliminate § 8(b) (4) and § 8(b) (7) in
48 See 485 U.S. 568, 576 (1988).
49 Id.
89
 Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 912 (quoting Retail Store Employees, 447 U.S. at 617-18 (Black-
mun, J., concurring in part)) (quotations omitted).
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the name of free speech would certainly justify increasing employee
speech rights.
C. Modify NLRA § 8(a)(2)'s Prohibition of Company Unions
Another possible compromise with employer concerns that should
be considered is modification of prohibition of company unions. Sec-
don 8(a) (2) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any la-
bor organization or contribute ... support to it." 51 This broad language
is given great breadth by the NLRA's definition of labor organization as
"any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee represented
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or
conditions of work."52
In 1959, early in the NLRA's history, the Supreme Court an- ,
nounced that this language was to be interpreted as broadly as its
wording suggests. In NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., the employer set up a
system of employee committees that met regularly with management
"to consider and discuss problems of mutual interest." 53 The Board
held the committees to be dominated labor organizations because
they were formed for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers." The Supreme Court affirmed, stressing that the term
"dealing with should not be read as "synonymous with the more lim-
ited term 'bargaining with.'"55 Thus, schemes or plans that are not
called unions, which do not involve collective bargaining, strikes, or
the settlement of grievance, may still constitute labor organizations.
They were dominated because they were the employer's creation and
could be dissolved by the employer. This opinion, together with the
broad language of the statute, served to put in doubt the legitimacy of
any employer-initiated scheme of worker involvement and convinced
many employers that the expense of setting up a new program was not
worth the risk.
In the late '70s and early '80s, commentators became increasingly
aware of the costs of applying § 8(a) (2) literally, which seemed to pre
51 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (2000).
52 Id. at § 152(5).
"360 U.S. 203, 204 (1959).
54 See id. at 207.
66 /d. at 211.
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vent experimentation with employee participation programs. Several
commentators argued that § 8(a) (2) was outdated and that it kept
U.S. companies from competing with companies in Europe and Japan
that used more innovative systems of labor relations. 56 Judge John Mi-
nor Wisdom decried what he saw as its adversarial assumptions: "an
inflexible attitude of hostility toward employee committees defeats
the Act. It erects an iron curtain ... penetrable only by ... a certified
union .. preventing the development of a decent, honest, construc-
tive relationship between management and labor." 57 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. Streamway Division of Scott
& Fetzer Co. declared in 1982 that "the adversarial model of labor reli-
dons is an anachronism."58
111'1994, the Dunlop Commission 59
 recommended that "nonun-
ion employee participation programs should not be unlawful simply
because they involve discussion of terms and conditions of work or
compensation where such discussion is incidental to the broad pur-
poses of these programs."6° The Commission also recommended that
"[t] he law should continue to prohibit companies from setting up .
dominated labor organizations.” 61 The recommendation was mild and
probably consistent with current law, but it drew a dissent from Doug-
las Fraser, the labor member of the commission who insisted that
"[s]ection 8(a) (2) stands as a bulwark against forms of representation
which are inherently illegitimate because they deny workers the right
to a voice through the independent representatives of their own
choosing and put the employer on 'both sides of the table.' "62
Fraser's dissent was endorsed by labor spokespeople and by sev-
eral pro-labor academics. It reflects the fear that loosening up the
strictures of the NLRA would confuse workers and lead them to ac-
56 This development is traced in Thomas C. Kohler, Models of 1%'orker Participation: The
Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REV. 499 (1986).
57
 NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 289 F.2d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 1961) (Wisdom, J„ dissenting
in part).
56 691 F.2d 288, 293 (6th Cir. 1982).
"'The Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations was announced
by Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich and Secretary of Commerce Ronald H. Brown on
March 24, 1993 to study and report on ways to improve labor management cooperation. It
was chaired by John T. Dunlop, former Secretary of Labor (1975-1976), hence the short
name the Dunlop Commission." See DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 39, at x.
60 Id. at 8.
61 Id.
62 The dissenting opinion of Douglas A. Fraser, dated January 3, 1995, is included as
an insert in DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 39 (attributing quote to Senator Wagner in
1935) (quoting LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1416-17).
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cept a meaningless voice in the operation of the enterprises for which
they work rather than insisting on true collective bargaining.
The § 8(a) (2) traditionalists have legitimate concerns about the
potential abuse that might result from well-orchestrated but ultimately
meaningless worker involvement programs. Nevertheless, I, along with
a growing number of pro-union commentators, believe that they are
fundamentally in error. 63 Intermediate forms of organization should be
thought of as opportunities for organization rather than as inhibitors of
unionization. The steel unions and the National Education Association
both evolved in part from company unions. German unions were able
to use the works councils that they once feared (for the same reasons
that American unions fear worker involvement schemes) as a way of
increasing their power,
When amendments to § 8(a) (2) are proposed, I believe that the
wiser approach for organized labor would be not to oppose them out-
right but to try to structure them so that they can be used to foster
union organizing. For example, § 8(a) (2) might be amended to spec-
ify programs in which employees selecting their own representatives
through secret ballot will be presumed legal. Americans trust elec-
tions, and elections would provide unions an opportunity to have
their leaders or members installed as the worker representatives in
such programs.
Even if new employee organizations do not lead to unionization,
they could make life better for employees. The contours of § 8(a) (2)
are changing, in any case, to permit more experimentation by em-
ployers. It would be, in my opinion, unwise for organized labor to as-
sume that changes in § 8(a) (2) were forestalled by the Board's 1992
decision in Electromation, Inc. 64 In that case, the employer, in the wake
of an organizing drive, established a series of employer committees
designed to discuss and address issues ranging from absenteeism and
attendance bonuses to compensation and no-smoking policies.° 5 The
Board unanimously held that the committees were dominated labor
organizations.°6 However, several of the Board members issued sepa-
rate opinions explaining why they would be reluctant to apply
§ 8(a) (2) to bona fide employer efforts to share power. Board mem-
ber Oviatt insisted that this decision did not apply to "management's
63 See, e.g., PAUL G. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 186-224 (1990).
64 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992).
65 Id. at 991.
66 See id. at 990.
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attempt to draw on the creativity of its employees by including them
in decisions that affect their work lives."57 Board member Raud-
abaugh insisted that he would apply § 8(a) (2) more leniently in the
future to permit employee participation programs that were not used
to stifle unionization.68
The Board's most recent opinion in Crown Cork C' Seal Co. 69
shows a retreat from Electromation and a further move away from Cabot
Carbon." The employer in that 2001 case established a series of work
teams with considerable voice in working conditions. 7 i The Board
held that because the managerial functions had been "flatly dele-
gated" to the teams, they were not labor organizations.72
Thus, like it or not, § 8(a) (2) is changing, and the only questions
are how much and how quickly. In my view, it behooves the labor
movement to try and shape the changes and to not limit itself to de-
crying and resisting them.
CONCLUSION
In sum, our basic labor law is currently not a friend to unions.
Efforts to improve it are likely to meet with significant resistance.
Nevertheless, they are worth the effort.
67 Id. at 1004 (Oviatt, concurring).
68 See id. at 1013-14 (Raudabaugh, concurring).
69 334 N.L.R.B. 699 (2001).
7° For an interesting discussion of the case's meaning, see generally H. Victoria He-
dian, The Implications of Crown Cork & Seal Co. for Employee Involvement Committees as "Labor
Organizations" Under the Wagner Act: What Constitutes "Dealing With" Pursuant to Section 2(5) of
the Act since Electromation, Inc.?, 18 LAB. Law. 235 (2002); Gerald L. Pauling II & M. An-
drew McGuire, The Implications of Crown Cork & Seal Co, for Employee Involvement Committees
as Labor Organizations Under the NLRA: What Constitutes "Dealing With" Pursuant to Section 2(5)
of the Act Since Electromation, Inc.? 18 LAB. LAW. 215 (2002).
71 See Crown Cork, 334 N.L.R.B. at 699.
72 See id. at 701.
